14 ideas
| 19735 | Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco] |
| 11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
| 19734 | If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco] |
| 19733 | Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |