32 ideas
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |