25 ideas
9766 | Study vagueness first by its logic, then by its truth-conditions, and then its metaphysics [Fine,K] |
9775 | Excluded Middle, and classical logic, may fail for vague predicates [Fine,K] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
9771 | Logic holding between indefinite sentences is the core of all language [Fine,K] |
9768 | Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K] |
9776 | A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K] |
9767 | A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K] |
9770 | Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K] |
9772 | Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K] |
9773 | With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K] |
9774 | Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K] |
14330 | To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong] |
9769 | Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K] |
6498 | Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H] |
5690 | A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker] |
5493 | If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan] |
4600 | Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |