22 ideas
| 9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
| 9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
| 9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
| 9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
| 9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
| 9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
| 17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |