15 ideas
| 17325 | Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins] |
| 17318 | Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins] |
| 17320 | Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins] |
| 17326 | The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins] |
| 17327 | Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins] |
| 17322 | Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 17324 | 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins] |
| 17321 | Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins] |
| 17323 | If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins] |
| 1554 | Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind] |
| 1555 | People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus] |
| 535 | The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus] |
| 1543 | He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus] |