13 ideas
19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
19691 | Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm] |
19690 | 'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm] |
19692 | You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |