Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Varieties of Reference', 'works' and 'Counterparts and Identity'

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12 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
3534 To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
12580 Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
7643 We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
3398 Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23794 Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
16366 The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12575 Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]