17 ideas
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |