Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Croce and Collingwood', 'The Spirit of the Laws (rev. 1757)' and 'Vagueness'

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101 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson]
Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson]
When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson]
The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson]
We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson]
If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson]
You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson]
Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson]
Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson]
Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson]
Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson]
Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson]
Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / b. Propositions as possible worlds
It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
True goodness is political, and consists of love of and submission to the laws [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Men do not desire to subjugate one another; domination is a complex and advanced idea [Montesquieu]
Primitive people would be too vulnerable and timid to attack anyone, so peace would reign [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
People are drawn into society by needs, shared fears, pleasure, and knowledge [Montesquieu]
People are guided by a multitude of influences, from which the spirit of a nation emerges [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
In small republics citizens identify with the public good, and abuses are fewer [Montesquieu]
In a large republic there is too much wealth for individuals to manage it [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
The rich would never submit to a lottery deciding which part of their society should be slaves [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
All states aim at preservation, and then have distinctive individual purposes [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The natural power of a father suggests rule by one person, but that authority can be spread [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
The nobility are an indispensable part of a monarchy [Montesquieu]
Monarchs must not just have links to the people; they need a body which maintains the laws [Montesquieu]
Ambition is good in a monarchy, because the monarch can always restrain it [Montesquieu]
In monarchies, men's actions are judged by their grand appearance, not their virtues [Montesquieu]
In a monarchy, the nobility must be hereditary, to bind them together [Montesquieu]
Monarchies can act more quickly, because one person is in charge [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
A despot's agents must be given power, so they inevitably become corrupt [Montesquieu]
Despots are always lazy and ignorant, so they always delegate their power to a vizier [Montesquieu]
Despotism and honour are incompatible, because honour scorns his power, and lives by rules [Montesquieu]
Tyranny is either real violence, or the imposition of unpopular legislation [Montesquieu]
The will of a despot is an enigma, so magistrates can only follow their own will [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
Aristocracy is democratic if they resemble the people, but not if they resemble the monarch [Montesquieu]
Great inequality between aristocrats and the rest is bad - and also among aristocrats themselves [Montesquieu]
If the nobility is numerous, the senate is the artistocracy, and the nobles are a democracy [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
If a government is to be preserved, it must first be loved [Montesquieu]
A government has a legislature, an international executive, and a domestic executive [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / b. Legislature
The judiciary must be separate from the legislature, to avoid arbitrary power [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
The fundamental laws of a democracy decide who can vote [Montesquieu]
It is basic to a democracy that the people themselves must name their ministers [Montesquieu]
Voting should be public, so the lower classes can be influenced by the example of notable people [Montesquieu]
All citizens (apart from the very humble poor) should choose their representatives [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / c. Direct democracy
In a democracy the people should manage themselves, and only delegate what they can't do [Montesquieu]
A democratic assembly must have a fixed number, to see whether everyone has spoken [Montesquieu]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If deputies represent people, they are accountable, but less so if they represent places [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Slavery is entirely bad; the master abandons the virtues, and they are pointless in the slave [Montesquieu]
Slaves are not members of the society, so no law can forbid them to run away [Montesquieu]
The demand for slavery is just the masters' demand for luxury [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Freedom of speech and writing, within the law, is essential to preserve liberty [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom in society is ability to do what is right, and not having to do what is wrong [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
No one even thinks of equality in monarchies and despotism; they all want superiority [Montesquieu]
Equality is not command by everyone or no one, but command and obedience among equals [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Democracy is corrupted by lack of equality, or by extreme equality (between rulers and ruled) [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Some equality can be achieved by social categories, combined with taxes and poor relief [Montesquieu]
Democracies may sometimes need to restrict equality [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Prior to positive laws there is natural equity, of obedience, gratitude, dependence and merit [Montesquieu]
Sensation gives animals natural laws, but knowledge can make them break them [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
The death penalty is permissible, because its victims enjoyed the protection of that law [Montesquieu]
If religion teaches determinism, penalties must be severe; if free will, then that is different [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
The only right victors have over captives is the protection of the former [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The clergy are essential to a monarchy, but dangerous in a republic [Montesquieu]
Religion can support the state when the law fails to do so [Montesquieu]
Religion has the most influence in despotic states, and reinforces veneration for the ruler [Montesquieu]
French slavery was accepted because it was the best method of religious conversion [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In monarchies education ennobles people, and in despotisms it debases them [Montesquieu]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Teaching is the best practice of the general virtue that leads us to love everyone [Montesquieu]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws are the necessary relations that derive from the nature of things [Montesquieu]