44 ideas
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |