14 ideas
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
| 20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
| 20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
| 20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
| 20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |