325 ideas
16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |