67 ideas
| 4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
| 22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
| 13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
| 3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
| 6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
| 3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
| 3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
| 16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
| 5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
| 4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
| 4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
| 4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
| 4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
| 4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
| 4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
| 4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
| 3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
| 16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
| 4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
| 16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
| 4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
| 4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
| 4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
| 4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
| 4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
| 4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
| 4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
| 4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
| 4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
| 4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
| 4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
| 4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
| 4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
| 4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
| 4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
| 4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
| 4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
| 4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
| 4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
| 4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
| 4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
| 4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
| 4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
| 5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
| 4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
| 7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
| 7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
| 20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
| 20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
| 20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
| 3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |