43 ideas
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
13520 | A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS] |
13524 | Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS] |
13522 | Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS] |
13521 | Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS] |
13523 | Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS] |
13529 | Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS] |
13526 | Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS] |
16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
13534 | In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS] |
13535 | First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS] |
16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
13531 | Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS] |
13532 | Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS] |
13519 | Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS] |
13533 | First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS] |
13537 | An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS] |
13539 | The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS] |
16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
13538 | If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS] |
13525 | Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS] |
16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
13530 | An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS] |
16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
13518 | Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS] |
9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |