12 ideas
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
| 20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
| 20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
| 20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
| 3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |