Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Croce and Collingwood', 'Ontological Dependence' and 'Essential Attribution'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
14255 We understand things through their dependency relations [Fine,K]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14250 Metaphysics deals with the existence of things and with the nature of things [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
14259 Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
14253 An object's 'being' isn't existence; there's more to an object than existence, and its nature doesn't include existence [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14261 There is 'weak' dependence in one definition, and 'strong' dependence in all the definitions [Fine,K]
14251 A natural modal account of dependence says x depends on y if y must exist when x does [Fine,K]
14257 An object depends on another if the second cannot be eliminated from the first's definition [Fine,K]
14254 Dependency is the real counterpart of one term defining another [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252 We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181 Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
11184 Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
14260 An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180 Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
11186 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
11185 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182 If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
11183 The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
11187 In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
20416 By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20417 Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
20419 We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
20418 The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11189 Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)]