Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Croce and Collingwood', 'Which Logic is the Right Logic?' and 'Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology'

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46 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 2. Phenomenology
Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl]
There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet]
Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet]
Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet]
Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl]
Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl]
'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl]
After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl]
Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp]
The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp]
Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp]
Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Only facts follow from facts [Husserl]