Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Croce and Collingwood', 'The Passions of the Soul' and 'Contingent Identity'

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25 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
3654 The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
4015 For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
4313 Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham]
23989 There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
20037 Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
20416 By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
20417 Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp]
20419 We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp]
20418 The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
16763 We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
4016 Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C]