25 ideas
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
20416 | By 1790 aestheticians were mainly trying to explain individual artistic genius [Kemp] |
20417 | Expression can be either necessary for art, or sufficient for art (or even both) [Kemp] |
20419 | We don't already know what to express, and then seek means of expressing it [Kemp] |
20418 | The horror expressed in some works of art could equallly be expressed by other means [Kemp] |
16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |