15 ideas
23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |