14 ideas
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |