Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Prior Analytics' and 'Action'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21757 Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
11060 Aristotelian syllogisms are three-part, subject-predicate, existentially committed, with laws of thought [Aristotle, by Hanna]
22271 Aristotle was the first to use schematic letters in logic [Aristotle, by Potter]
18909 Aristotelian sentences are made up by one of four 'formative' connectors [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
8080 Aristotelian identified 256 possible syllogisms, saying that 19 are valid [Aristotle, by Devlin]
13912 Aristotle replaced Plato's noun-verb form with unions of pairs of terms by one of four 'copulae' [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen/Sayward]
8071 Aristotle listed nineteen valid syllogisms (though a few of them were wrong) [Aristotle, by Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13819 Aristotle's said some Fs are G or some Fs are not G, forgetting that there might be no Fs [Bostock on Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
9403 There are three different deductions for actual terms, necessary terms and possible terms [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
11148 Deduction is when we suppose one thing, and another necessarily follows [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18896 Aristotle places terms at opposite ends, joined by a quantified copula [Aristotle, by Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
3300 Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
11149 Affirming/denying sentences are universal, particular, or indeterminate [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
8079 Aristotelian logic has two quantifiers of the subject ('all' and 'some') [Aristotle, by Devlin]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14641 A deduction is necessary if the major (but not the minor) premise is also necessary [Aristotle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18911 Linguistic terms form a hierarchy, with higher terms predicable of increasing numbers of things [Aristotle, by Engelbretsen]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]