138 ideas
| 5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
| 5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
| 19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
| 15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
| 15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
| 15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
| 5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
| 21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
| 5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
| 21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
| 22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
| 15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
| 5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
| 5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
| 15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
| 15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
| 21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
| 15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
| 15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
| 5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
| 19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
| 5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
| 19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
| 5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
| 19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
| 7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
| 5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
| 5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| 5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
| 5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
| 21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
| 5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
| 5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
| 15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
| 15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
| 15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
| 5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
| 17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
| 5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
| 17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
| 5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
| 15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
| 22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
| 5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
| 5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| 4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
| 4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
| 4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
| 17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
| 15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
| 15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
| 5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
| 5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
| 5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
| 5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
| 15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
| 5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
| 5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
| 22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
| 5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
| 5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
| 5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
| 5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
| 5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
| 5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
| 4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
| 5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
| 15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
| 6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
| 17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
| 15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
| 15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
| 7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
| 5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
| 5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
| 5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
| 15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
| 15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
| 15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
| 15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
| 5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
| 5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
| 5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
| 5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
| 5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
| 5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
| 5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| 5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
| 15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
| 15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
| 5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
| 5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
| 21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
| 5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
| 21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
| 15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
| 5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
| 13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
| 5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
| 15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |
| 5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
| 15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
| 21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
| 15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
| 15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |