Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Varieties of Things' and 'The New Institutional Theory of Art'

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53 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
A work of art is an artifact created for the artworld [Dickie]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham]