59 ideas
18390 | All metaphysical discussion should be guided by a quest for truthmakers [Armstrong] |
21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
18467 | Truth-making can't be entailment, because truthmakers are portions of reality [Armstrong] |
18468 | Armstrong says truthmakers necessitate their truth, where 'necessitate' is a primitive relation [Armstrong, by MacBride] |
18377 | Negative truths have as truthmakers all states of affairs relevant to the truth [Armstrong] |
18382 | The nature of arctic animals is truthmaker for the absence of penguins there [Armstrong] |
18384 | One truthmaker will do for a contingent truth and for its contradictory [Armstrong] |
18394 | In mathematics, truthmakers are possible instantiations of structures [Armstrong] |
18387 | The truthmakers for possible unicorns are the elements in their combination [Armstrong] |
18386 | What is the truthmaker for 'it is possible that there could have been nothing'? [Armstrong] |
18381 | Necessitating general truthmakers must also specify their limits [Armstrong] |
18396 | The set theory brackets { } assert that the member is a unit [Armstrong] |
18393 | For 'there is a class with no members' we don't need the null set as truthmaker [Armstrong] |
18392 | Classes have cardinalities, so their members must all be treated as units [Armstrong] |
21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
18385 | Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong] |
22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
18391 | 'Naturalism' says only the world of space-time exists [Armstrong] |
18374 | Truthmaking needs states of affairs, to unite particulars with tropes or universals. [Armstrong] |
22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
18372 | We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong] |
18379 | The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong] |
18378 | Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
18400 | Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
18371 | The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong] |
18389 | When entities contain entities, or overlap with them, there is 'partial' identity [Armstrong] |
18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
18375 | General truths are a type of negative truth, saying there are no more ravens than black ones [Armstrong] |
20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
18368 | For all being, there is a potential proposition which expresses its existence and nature [Armstrong] |
18370 | A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong] |
21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
20082 | Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R] |
18380 | Negative causations supervene on positive causations plus their laws? [Armstrong] |
18401 | The pure present moment is too brief to be experienced [Armstrong] |