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All the ideas for 'Introduction to the Philosophy of History', 'Properties' and 'Possible Worlds'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
World history has no room for happiness [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]