Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Action, Reasons and Causes' and 'Models and Reality'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21757 Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
13655 The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro]
9915 V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
9913 The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9914 It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
7949 Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
20020 If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20072 We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
20045 Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]