83 ideas
| 21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
| 22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
| 21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
| 21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
| 21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
| 18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
| 18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
| 18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
| 20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
| 22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
| 21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
| 21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
| 21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |