61 ideas
19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
19115 | You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli] |
19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
19119 | We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli] |
19111 | Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli] |
19114 | Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli] |
19113 | Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli] |
19116 | Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli] |
19117 | We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli] |
19118 | People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli] |
21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
19110 | In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli] |
19112 | Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli] |
15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington] |
13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington] |
13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington] |
13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington] |
15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |