24 ideas
| 21757 | Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel] |
| 13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
| 10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
| 18851 | Pairing (with Extensionality) guarantees an infinity of sets, just from a single element [Rosen] |
| 9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
| 9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
| 18852 | A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen] |
| 9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
| 18849 | Metaphysical necessity is absolute and universal; metaphysical possibility is very tolerant [Rosen] |
| 18850 | 'Metaphysical' modality is the one that makes the necessity or contingency of laws of nature interesting [Rosen] |
| 18858 | Sets, universals and aggregates may be metaphysically necessary in one sense, but not another [Rosen] |
| 18857 | Standard Metaphysical Necessity: P holds wherever the actual form of the world holds [Rosen] |
| 18856 | Non-Standard Metaphysical Necessity: when ¬P is incompatible with the nature of things [Rosen] |
| 18848 | Something may be necessary because of logic, but is that therefore a special sort of necessity? [Rosen] |
| 18855 | Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds [Rosen] |
| 18853 | A proposition is 'correctly' conceivable if an ominiscient being could conceive it [Rosen] |
| 9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
| 11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
| 18854 | The MRL view says laws are the theorems of the simplest and strongest account of the world [Rosen] |