Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic'' and 'The Nature of Mathematics'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege]
Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege]
Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]