15 ideas
| 13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
| 13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
| 13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
| 13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
| 13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
| 13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
| 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
| 22040 | Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel] |
| 22039 | Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22465 | We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot] |
| 22466 | We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot] |
| 22467 | Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot] |
| 22470 | A good moral system benefits its participants, and so demands reciprocity [Foot] |
| 22468 | Virtues can have aims, but good states of affairs are not among them [Foot] |
| 22469 | Some virtues imply rules, and others concern attachment [Foot] |