98 ideas
19635 | Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran] |
8215 | Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida] |
16011 | Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel] |
5433 | For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell] |
3301 | On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel] |
19661 | Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux] |
20952 | Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie] |
18019 | People have dreams which involve category mistakes [Magidor] |
17998 | Category mistakes are either syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic [Magidor] |
18011 | Category mistakes seem to be universal across languages [Magidor] |
18012 | Category mistakes as syntactic needs a huge number of fine-grained rules [Magidor] |
18013 | Embedded (in 'he said that…') category mistakes show syntax isn't the problem [Magidor] |
18021 | Category mistakes are meaningful, because metaphors are meaningful category mistakes [Magidor] |
18015 | The normal compositional view makes category mistakes meaningful [Magidor] |
18017 | If a category mistake is synonymous across two languages, that implies it is meaningful [Magidor] |
18031 | If a category mistake has unimaginable truth-conditions, then it seems to be meaningless [Magidor] |
18016 | Two good sentences should combine to make a good sentence, but that might be absurd [Magidor] |
18030 | A good explanation of why category mistakes sound wrong is that they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18032 | Category mistakes are neither verifiable nor analytic, so verificationism says they are meaningless [Magidor] |
18034 | Category mistakes play no role in mental life, so conceptual role semantics makes them meaningless [Magidor] |
18037 | Maybe when you say 'two is green', the predicate somehow fails to apply? [Magidor] |
18039 | If category mistakes aren't syntax failure or meaningless, maybe they just lack a truth-value? [Magidor] |
18058 | Maybe the presuppositions of category mistakes are the abilities of things? [Magidor] |
18041 | Category mistakes suffer from pragmatic presupposition failure (which is not mere triviality) [Magidor] |
18056 | Category mistakes because of presuppositions still have a truth value (usually 'false') [Magidor] |
18055 | In 'two is green', 'green' has a presupposition of being coloured [Magidor] |
18057 | 'Numbers are coloured and the number two is green' seems to be acceptable [Magidor] |
18059 | The presuppositions in category mistakes reveal nothing about ontology [Magidor] |
9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
18040 | Intensional logic maps logical space, showing which predicates are compatible or incompatible [Magidor] |
9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
21777 | Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |
5645 | The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton] |
5646 | Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton] |
21755 | For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21754 | Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22079 | Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
18060 | We can explain the statue/clay problem by a category mistake with a false premise [Magidor] |
9225 | Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H] |
18020 | Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor] |
18035 | Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor] |
18018 | To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor] |
18008 | Generative semantics says structure is determined by semantics as well as syntactic rules [Magidor] |
18010 | 'John is easy to please' and 'John is eager to please' have different deep structure [Magidor] |
18053 | The semantics of a sentence is its potential for changing a context [Magidor] |
18000 | Weaker compositionality says meaningful well-formed sentences get the meaning from the parts [Magidor] |
17999 | Strong compositionality says meaningful expressions syntactically well-formed are meaningful [Magidor] |
18014 | Understanding unlimited numbers of sentences suggests that meaning is compositional [Magidor] |
18001 | Are there partial propositions, lacking truth value in some possible worlds? [Magidor] |
18036 | A sentence can be meaningful, and yet lack a truth value [Magidor] |
18051 | In the pragmatic approach, presuppositions are assumed in a context, for successful assertion [Magidor] |
18043 | The infelicitiousness of trivial truth is explained by uninformativeness, or a static context-set [Magidor] |
18042 | The infelicitiousness of trivial falsity is explained by expectations, or the loss of a context-set [Magidor] |
18047 | A presupposition is what makes an utterance sound wrong if it is not assumed? [Magidor] |
18048 | A test for presupposition would be if it provoked 'hey wait a minute - I have no idea that....' [Magidor] |
18049 | The best tests for presupposition are projecting it to negation, conditional, conjunction, questions [Magidor] |
18050 | If both s and not-s entail a sentence p, then p is a presupposition [Magidor] |
18054 | Why do certain words trigger presuppositions? [Magidor] |
18024 | One theory says metaphors mean the same as the corresponding simile [Magidor] |
18023 | Theories of metaphor divide over whether they must have literal meanings [Magidor] |
18025 | The simile view of metaphors removes their magic, and won't explain why we use them [Magidor] |
18026 | Maybe a metaphor is just a substitute for what is intended literally, like 'icy' for 'unemotional' [Magidor] |
18028 | Gricean theories of metaphor involve conversational implicatures based on literal meanings [Magidor] |
18029 | Non-cognitivist views of metaphor says there are no metaphorical meanings, just effects of the literal [Magidor] |
18022 | Metaphors tend to involve category mistakes, by joining disjoint domains [Magidor] |
18027 | Metaphors as substitutes for the literal misses one predicate varying with context [Magidor] |
21758 | Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
20414 | Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge] |
3909 | Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton] |
4347 | When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel] |
4188 | Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel] |
6686 | Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham] |