87 ideas
19073 | True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel] |
15624 | Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel] |
15631 | The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel] |
15612 | Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel] |
23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
21768 | Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel] |
23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
21984 | We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel] |
23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
22081 | Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel] |
15626 | Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel] |
15616 | If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel] |
15638 | Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel] |
21767 | Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel] |
15639 | Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel] |
15615 | Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel] |
19070 | Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel] |
23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
5644 | In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton] |
19072 | In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel] |
10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
19071 | The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel] |
13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
21595 | Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel] |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
15628 | The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel] |
15629 | Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel] |
15630 | Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel] |
23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
22078 | Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel] |
15634 | Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel] |
21981 | The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel] |
15637 | Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel] |
15613 | Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel] |
15636 | The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel] |
23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
22300 | Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel] |
15609 | The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel] |
15625 | Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel] |
15619 | Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel] |
15620 | Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel] |
15622 | Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel] |
15621 | Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel] |
15632 | The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel] |
23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
15623 | Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel] |
23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
15617 | In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel] |
10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
15608 | The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel] |
21986 | Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
15607 | We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel] |
15610 | Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel] |
23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |
23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
15614 | Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel] |
23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |
15618 | If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel] |
15635 | The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel] |
21980 | God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel] |
15633 | We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel] |