Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Introduction to the Philosophy of History', 'works' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Hegel inserted society and history between the God-world, man-nature, man-being binary pairs [Hegel, by Safranski]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
If parallelism is true, how does the mind know about the body? [Crease]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
World history has no room for happiness [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
The state of nature is one of untamed brutality [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The soul of the people is an organisation of its members which produces an essential unity [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
The human race matters, and individuals have little importance [Hegel]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
In a good state the goal of the citizens and of the whole state are united [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The goal of the world is Spirit's consciousness and enactment of freedom [Hegel]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
We should all agree that there is reason in history [Hegel]