67 ideas
19635 | Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran] |
8215 | Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida] |
16011 | Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel] |
5433 | For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell] |
3301 | On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel] |
19661 | Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux] |
20952 | Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie] |
21777 | Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
5645 | The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton] |
5646 | Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton] |
21755 | For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
21754 | Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
22079 | Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
9225 | Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H] |
6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
21758 | Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
20414 | Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge] |
20977 | Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham] |
3909 | Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton] |
21003 | Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham] |
4347 | When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel] |
4188 | Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel] |
6686 | Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham] |