Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Mind (Encylopedia III)', 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence' and 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22040 Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
22039 Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]