12 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
9212 | Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K] |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
22040 | Freedom is produced by the activity of the mind, and is not intrinsically given [Hegel] |
22039 | Geist is distinct from nature, not as a substance, but because of its normativity [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |