17 ideas
| 21757 | Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel] |
| 18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
| 18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
| 18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
| 18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
| 18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
| 18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
| 18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
| 18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
| 18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
| 13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
| 8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
| 13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
| 14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |