63 ideas
| 19635 | Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran] |
| 8215 | Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida] |
| 16011 | Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel] |
| 5433 | For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell] |
| 18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
| 3301 | On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel] |
| 19661 | Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux] |
| 20952 | Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
| 18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
| 18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
| 18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
| 18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
| 18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
| 18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
| 18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
| 18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
| 18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
| 18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
| 18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
| 18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
| 18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
| 18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
| 18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
| 18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
| 18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
| 18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
| 21777 | Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
| 18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
| 18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
| 18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
| 18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
| 18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
| 5645 | The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 5646 | Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 21755 | For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21754 | Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22079 | Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| 18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
| 18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
| 18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
| 18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
| 18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
| 18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
| 18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
| 18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
| 9225 | Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H] |
| 18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
| 18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
| 18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
| 21758 | Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 20414 | Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge] |
| 3909 | Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 4347 | When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel] |
| 4188 | Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel] |
| 6686 | Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham] |