Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930' and 'Can there be Vague Objects?'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21757 Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
22285 Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
22301 The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
22324 It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
22279 Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
22291 Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
22295 Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
22310 The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
22298 Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
22287 If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
16459 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
16460 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / c. Ancestral relation
22284 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
14484 If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
16224 There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
22281 A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
22327 Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
22273 Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
22290 The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
22283 Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter]
22282 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter]
22296 Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter]