Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Some Remarks on Essentialism' and 'Mathematics without Foundations'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
21757 Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
9944 We understand some statements about all sets [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
9937 I do not believe mathematics either has or needs 'foundations' [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
9939 It is conceivable that the axioms of arithmetic or propositional logic might be changed [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
9940 Maybe mathematics is empirical in that we could try to change it [Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
9941 Science requires more than consistency of mathematics [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9943 You can't deny a hypothesis a truth-value simply because we may never know it! [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]