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All the ideas for 'Logic (Encyclopedia I)', 'Philosophical Fragments' and 'Parts'

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117 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
True philosophy aims at absolute unity, while our understanding sees only separation [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
Free thinking has no presuppositions [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
The ideal of reason is the unification of abstract identity (or 'concept') and being [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Older metaphysics naively assumed that thought grasped things in themselves [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
We must break up the rigidity that our understanding has imposed [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
Let thought follow its own course, and don't interfere [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Categories create objective experience, but are too conditioned by things to actually grasp them [Hegel]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
If truth is just non-contradiction, we must take care that our basic concepts aren't contradictory [Hegel]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Older metaphysics became dogmatic, by assuming opposed assertions must be true and false [Hegel]
Dialectic is seen in popular proverbs like 'pride comes before a fall' [Hegel]
Dialectic is the moving soul of scientific progression, the principle which binds science together [Hegel]
Socratic dialectic is subjective, but Plato made it freely scientific and objective [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Superficial truth is knowing how something is, which is consciousness of bare correctness [Hegel]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false [Hegel, by Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
In the deeper sense of truth, to be untrue resembles being bad; badness is untrue to a thing's nature [Hegel]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
The deeper sense of truth is a thing matching the idea of what it ought to be [Hegel]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons]
Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons]
Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons]
A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 2. Terminology of Mereology
Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons]
Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons]
Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons]
Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons]
Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons]
Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons]
General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons]
General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons]
Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons]
Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons]
Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons]
The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons]
Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons]
Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 4. Groups
A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons]
The same members may form two groups [Simons]
'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is the maxim of definite understanding, but just produces contradictions [Hegel]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The idea that contradiction is essential to rational understanding is a key modern idea [Hegel]
Tenderness for the world solves the antinomies; contradiction is in our reason, not in the essence of the world [Hegel]
Antinomies are not just in four objects, but in all objects, all representations, all objects and all ideas [Hegel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons]
There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
I don't believe in processes [Simons]
Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 3. Moments
Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons]
Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons]
A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons]
A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons]
A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Even simple propositions about sensations are filled with categories [Hegel]
Thought about particulars is done entirely through categories [Hegel]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
The one substance is formless without the mediation of dialectical concepts [Hegel]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons]
Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons]
'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons]
If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons]
Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons]
Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essence is the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Real cognition grasps a thing from within itself, and is not satisfied with mere predicates [Hegel]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons]
Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons]
The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
The Cogito is at the very centre of the entire concern of modern philosophy [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Existence is just a set of relationships [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The sensible is distinguished from thought by being about singular things [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sense perception is secondary and dependent, while thought is independent and primitive [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Empiricism made particular knowledge possible, and blocked wild claims [Hegel]
Empiricism contains the important idea that we should see knowledge for ourselves, and be part of it [Hegel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Empiricism unknowingly contains and uses a metaphysic, which underlies its categories [Hegel]
Empiricism of the finite denies the supersensible, and can only think with formal abstraction [Hegel]
The Humean view stops us thinking about perception, and finding universals and necessities in it [Hegel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Humean scepticism, unlike ancient Greek scepticism, accepts the truth of experience as basic [Hegel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
The act of thinking is the bringing forth of universals [Hegel]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 2. Categories of Understanding
Hegel's system has a vast number of basic concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Old metaphysics tried to grasp eternal truths through causal events, which is impossible [Hegel]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The older conception of God was emptied of human features, to make it worthy of the Infinite [Hegel]
God is the absolute thing, and also the absolute person [Hegel]
If God is the abstract of Supremely Real Essence, then God is a mere Beyond, and unknowable [Hegel]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
We establish unification of the Ideal by the ontological proof, deriving being from abstraction of thinking [Hegel]