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All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Getting Causes from Powers' and 'Why the Universe Exists'

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88 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum]
Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum]
The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum]
Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]