Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Lectures on the History of Philosophy', 'Outline of a Theory of Truth' and 'Identity and Existence in Logic'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the conceptual essence of the shape of history [Hegel]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten]
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
The Tarskian move to a metalanguage may not be essential for truth theories [Kripke, by Gupta]
Certain three-valued languages can contain their own truth predicates [Kripke, by Gupta]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
Kripke classified fixed points, and illuminated their use for clarifications [Kripke, by Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]