Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II)', 'What is it like to be a bat?' and 'Events'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


14 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
All revolutions result from spirit changing its categories, to achieve a deeper understanding [Hegel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis]