85 ideas
| 19635 | Hegel produced modern optimism; he failed to grasp that consciousness never progresses [Hegel, by Cioran] |
| 8215 | Hegel was the last philosopher of the Book [Hegel, by Derrida] |
| 16011 | Hegel doesn't storm the heavens like the giants, but works his way up by syllogisms [Kierkegaard on Hegel] |
| 5433 | For Hegel, things are incomplete, and contain external references in their own nature [Hegel, by Russell] |
| 3301 | On the continent it is generally believed that metaphysics died with Hegel [Benardete,JA on Hegel] |
| 19661 | Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux] |
| 20952 | Rather than in three stages, Hegel presented his dialectic as 'negation of the negation' [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 21777 | Negation of negation doubles back into a self-relationship [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 1618 | We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine] |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 1611 | Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine] |
| 1613 | Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine] |
| 1616 | Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine] |
| 1615 | Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine] |
| 1614 | Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine] |
| 10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 5645 | The dialectical opposition of being and nothing is resolved in passing to the concept of becoming [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 4064 | The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane] |
| 5646 | Hegel gives an ontological proof of the existence of everything [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 19277 | Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale] |
| 12210 | Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 8496 | What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine] |
| 1610 | To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine] |
| 8459 | Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8497 | An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine] |
| 16261 | If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine] |
| 7698 | If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine] |
| 21755 | For Hegel, categories shift their form in the course of history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21754 | Our concepts and categories disclose the world, because we are part of the world [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22079 | Hegel said Kant's fixed categories actually vary with culture and era [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 1612 | Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine] |
| 15402 | There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine] |
| 4443 | Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 8498 | Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine] |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 8856 | Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 12443 | Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine] |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| 18209 | We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine] |
| 9225 | Hegel reputedly claimed to know a priori that there are five planets [Hegel, by Field,H] |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| 1619 | There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine] |
| 1609 | I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine] |
| 1617 | The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine] |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| 19159 | Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| 21758 | Humans have no fixed identity, but produce and reveal their shifting identity in history [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 20414 | Hegel's Absolute Spirit is the union of human rational activity at a moment, and whatever that sustains [Hegel, by Eldridge] |
| 3909 | Society isn’t founded on a contract, since contracts presuppose a society [Hegel, by Scruton] |
| 4347 | When man wills the natural, it is no longer natural [Hegel] |
| 4188 | Hegel's entire philosophy is nothing but a monstrous amplification of the ontological proof [Schopenhauer on Hegel] |
| 6686 | Hegel said he was offering an encyclopaedic rationalisation of Christianity [Hegel, by Graham] |