13 ideas
10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
17505 | Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam] |
9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
11908 | Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam] |
17508 | Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam] |
17506 | I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam] |
9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
17507 | Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam] |
11904 | Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P] |