10 ideas
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |
9454 | The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
9453 | Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer] |
9452 | Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer] |
9451 | Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer] |
20064 | Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R] |