Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'fragments/reports' and 'Intuitionism and Formalism'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
23367 Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9455 Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
9454 The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
9453 Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
9452 Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
9451 Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]