Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Propositions', 'Preface to Great Instauration (Renewal)' and 'Infinitism solution to regress problem'

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
The four leading theories of definite descriptions are Frege's, Russell's, Evans's, and Prior's [Bealer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences saying the same with the same rigid designators may still express different propositions [Bealer]
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Modal logic and brain science have reaffirmed traditional belief in propositions [Bealer]